UNITED STATES
INFORMATION
AGENCY

# Office of Research and Analysis



II. U.S. Or U.S.S.R. The Wave Of The Future?

WE-63 April, 1960

> S U R V E Y R E S E A R C H S T U D I E S West European Public Opinion Barometer

CONFIDENTIAL

## FOREWORD

The present report is the second of a series based upon the latest round of Barometer surveys in Western Europe. The current soundings were timed to describe the West European climate of opinion on the eve of the Paris Summit Conference as a contribution to guidance for Summit preparations.

The findings reported are based upon coordinated surveys in Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, conducted between mid-February and mid-March 1960. As usual, interviewing was performed via contracts with local survey organizations and under their own auspices with no indication to respondents of any American connection with the surveys.

Sampling for each country was conducted on the basis of probability principles to ensure an accurate cross-section of the population 21 years of age and above. The size of the overall sample in each country was approximately 1200 cases. However, because information was needed on a large number of issues extensive use was made of the so-called "split ballot" technique wherein particular questions are asked of half-samples of the order of 600 cases. This procedure permits coverage of a larger number of issues while still yielding figures of acceptable reliability for broad guidance purposes, since percentages based upon 600 cases are highly unlikely to differ by as much as the order of six per cent from the results that would be obtained from a complete census of the population sampled. Moreover, from the point of view of reflecting West European opinion in the four major nations, rather than particular countries, the sample is of the order of 2400 cases and thus permits general estimates of considerable precision.

The use of the split half method also has important methodological advantages in permitting a check on the effect of differences in question formulations, through giving each of two versions to random halves of the sample and observing to what extent the results differ.

As readers of the Barometer series have been frequently reminded, differences between percentages in trend comparisons are only to be considered significant if they are appreciable enough to be reliably beyond chance variation. Conclusions drawn in the text take such considerations into account. Anyone interested in statistical details, or in further information on any other aspects of the present survey, is invited to consult the Survey Research Division, Office of Research and Analysis, USIA.

Frequently throughout this and other Barometer reports readers will note that comparisons are made not in terms of the percentage favorable to the U.S. on a given issue but in terms of a <u>net</u> favorable figure -- favorable answers minus unfavorable answers. Such an index often provides a useful basis of comparison since it helps take into account the extent to which favorable responses are offset by unfavorable.

The need for maximum speed in issuing the present series of reports precludes consideration of how the opinion of more elite elements of the population compares with the sentiments of the general public. It is hoped that such information can later be made available to anyone interested. Also as time permits an analysis is planned of the relationship of answers to particular questions to answers to other questions. Such "crossbreaks" are frequently useful in additionally clarifying the precise significance of particular answer patterns.

## SUMMARY

Despite a level of esteem for the U.S. which, the preceding paper has shown, has never been higher in West European Barometer surveys to date, confidence in the U.S. as the "wave of the future" has been declining to the point where the Soviet Union is now judged to be ahead in critical areas of U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition. A Soviet lead in West European eyes shows up most markedly in space developments, in science generally and in overall military strength.

America retains its greatest pre-eminence over the Soviet Union in the economic area, particularly in general living standards, and few West Europeans agree with Premier Khrushchev's boast that the Soviet economic system will "bury" U.S. capitalism. Other areas of clear U.S. leadership, now and in anticipation of 10 years hence, are in providing economic aid to other countries, in social welfare provisions for its citizens, in general non-technical education, in medical science and, marginally in France, in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy.

But in other equally important areas the U.S. either now or in visions of 10 years hence ranks at no better than a standoff with the Soviet Union in some countries, particularly in Great Britain and France. These are the areas of technical education, scientific development apart from space, agricultural production, culture (music, art and literature), and industrial production. In this last area the U.S. stands well ahead in current judgments, but drops off sharply in estimates of the future.

The results of two brief inquiries into more personal qualities of the American and Soviet people suggest that West Europeans predominantly view the Soviet people as having greater faith in their basic principles and as being willing to work harder to have their country lead in national achievement. While these indications cannot be taken as entirely unambiguous, they raise the possibility that in certain "national morale" aspects the image of the U.S. does not compete wholly favorably with that of the Soviet Union.

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<sup>1</sup> The survey was conducted prior to current U.S. space successes. Further trend tests are now in process to ascertain to what extent these U.S. space developments may have cut into Soviet leadership.

## 1. U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Strength 25 Years Hence

## STRENGTH IN GENERAL...

If the U.S. and the Soviet Union settle down to a 20 or 25 year period of competitive coexistence, the predominant viewpoint in both Great Britain and France is that the U.S.S.R. will end up as the stronger power. In West Germany and Italy opinions split -- which means that in none of the four countries surveyed is there currently any predominant feeling that the U.S. will emerge ahead in this test of the "wave of the future." Present attitudes in this respect mark a deterioration in all four countries from earlier levels of confidence in the U.S.

"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"

		Great Britain				West Germany					
	Apr.	Nov.	Oct: '58	Nov.	Feb. <u>'60</u>	Apr. '56	Nov.	Oct. '58	Nov.	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(806)		(1198)		(613)	(863)		(1195)			(599)
U.S.	35%	37%	36%		25%	37%	31%	38%	36%		29%
U.S.S.R.	25	34	34	NA	44	22	21	21	20	NA	29
Both equally strong(Vo		11	11		10	14	24	25	19		19
No opinion	25 100%	18 100%	19 100%		21 100%	27 100%	24 100%	16 100%	25 100%		23 100%
Net U.S. stronger	10	3	2		<b>-</b> 19	15	10	17	16		0
		_						<b>T.</b>	1		
_	/ <del></del>		rance		74001	( <del>011</del> )	70021	Ita		((50)	/501\
No. of cases	(800)	(802)	(1220)		(608)	(911)	(807)	(1272)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S.	10%	9%	14%		7%	25%	28%	29%	27%	31%	22%
U.S.S.R.	21	20"	24	NA	35	14	14	25	19	16	24
Both equally strong(V	14	22	30		25	26	34	27	23	28	32
No opinion	55_	49	32		_33_	35	24	<u> 19</u>	31_	25	22
·	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. stronger	-11	-11	<b>-</b> 10 .		-28	11	14	4	8	15	<b>-</b> 2

## MILITARY VERSUS ECONOMIC STRENGTH...

More specific inquiries posed in an alternate form of the questionnaire reveal that the U.S. is judged to be falling behind the U.S.S.R. primarily in the military rather than in the economic area. In all four countries, though in West Germany by an unreliable margin, the U.S. is seen as behind the U.S.S.R. in military strength 25 years hence. In the economic area, on the other hand, only in France is a Soviet lead predominantly anticipated.

Everywhere except in Italy, it will be noted, small proportions see Communist China emerging in the van over a 25 year period. In evaluating U.S. standing versus the Communist bloc, rather than versus the U.S.S.R. alone, these votes must, of course, be added to those for Russia.

"If the major world powers settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the following countries -- U.S., U.S.S.R., or China, -- do you think will end up the strongest economically?"

No. of cases	Great <u>Britain</u> Feb. °60 ( 608 )	West <u>Germany</u> Feb. '60 (623)	France Feb. '60 ( 620 )	<u>Italy</u> Feb. '60 ( 579 )
U.S.	45%	52%	23%	48%
U.S.S.R.	33	29	37	27
China	6	8	10	1
No opinion	_16	_11	_30	_24
	100%	100%	100%	100%

"And how about military strength -- which of the three do you think will end up the strongest militarily?"

No. of cases	Great Britain Feb. 600 (608)	West Germany Feb. '60 (623)	France Feb. *60 (620)	<u>Italy</u> Feb. *60 ( 579 )
U.S.	21%	36%	13%	32%
U.S.S.R.	52	40	40	41
China	9	8	14	2
No opinion	_18	_16_	_33_	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%

## II. Current U.S. Versus Soviet Military Standing

In talking about the U.S. being behind the U.S.S.R. militarily in 25 years West Europeans apparently are not thinking of something that is going to happen, but rather of something that in their judgment has already happened. This is the import of the findings below, which indicate that except in Italy, where opinions are rather evenly divided, the clearly predominant viewpoint is that Soviet Russia is ahead of the U.S. in total military strength at the present time. It is also evident in the latest survey that confidence in the U.S. in this connection has substantially decreased from earlier levels.

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

	Gr	eat Brit	ain	West Germany				
No. of coope	Nov. *57 (800)	Oct. '58 (611)	Feb. '601 (613)	9 (	ov. <u>57</u> 13) (	Oct. '58 1739)	Feb. 160 (599)	
No. of cases	(800)	(ОТТ)	(013)	(0.	15) (	11077	(0)))	
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia U.S. a little ahead	4% 15	7% 19	( <sub>15%</sub>	16 22	<b>5%</b> 2	9% 15	( <sub>22%</sub>	
Russia a little ahead of U.S. Russia considerably ahead	31 19	22 19	( <sub>59</sub>	1	7 6	16 7	( <sub>47</sub>	
Both equal (Vol.) No opinion	6 25 100%	8 25 100%	4 <u>22</u> 100%	$\frac{1}{10}$	9_	22 31 100%	8 23 100%	,
Net U.S. ahead	-31	-15	-44	1	5.	1	<b>-</b> 25	
		France				Italy		
	Nov.	Oct	Feb.	Nov.	Octo	Nov.	Dec.	Feb.
No. of cases	<u>'57</u> (802)	( <del>624</del> )	*60°1 (608)	<u>†57</u> (807)	(635)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia U.S. a little ahead	6% 11	3% 16	( <sub>16%</sub>	17% 17	13% 25	16% 17	18% 18	(38%
Russia a little ahead of U.S. Russia considerably ahead	13 12	21 8	(37	13 9	14 9	11 7	10 8	(32
Both equal (Vol.) No opinion	20 <u>38</u> 100%	34 18 100%	16 31 100%	23 21 100%	22 <u>17</u> 100%	24 25 100%	26 20 100%	5 25 100%
Net U.S. ahead	-8	-10	-21	12	15	15	18	6,,

The February 1960 wording is basically comparable, but the format has been somewhat revised as part of a comparative question.

## III. <u>U.S. Versus Soviet Standing In Science</u> <u>And Space Developments</u>

CURRENT AND FUTURE STANDINGS ...

The present survey embodied an effort to obtain a fairly systematic picture of U.S. versus Soviet standing, both in space developments and science in general, to supplement the sometimes confusing bits and pieces of the science picture available to date. In particular, an effort was made to differentiate U.S. standing in scientific development inclusive of space achievements and scientific development apart from space science. To enhance the value of the indications as a basis for estimating West European visions of the future, judgments were obtained not only with reference to the present, but also 10 years hence.

It may first be observed in the results tabulated on the page following that the U.S.S.R., as of the time of the present survey, was seen as ahead of the U.S. in space developments by a very large preponderance of the general population in each of the countries surveyed. The 10 year projections indicate an improved situation in this respect but still show the U.S. behind the U.S.S.R. in the judgment of predominant proportions in each country.

Next, in scientific development with space science not excluded the opinion prevails by large margins in Great Britain and France that the U.S.S.R. is presently ahead. In Italy opinions split with a slight lean toward the U.S., and in West Germany the U.S. is predominantly judged to be ahead at the present time. Expectations for 10 years hence show some improvement for the U.S. position in Great Britain and France but not enough to change the general pattern of sentiment.

Finally, in general scientific development apart from space science it may be seen that U.S. standing is considerably better, but notwithstanding, the U.S. is predominantly judged ahead and likely to remain ahead only by the West Germans -- who thus reveal a markedly greater respect for American science here (apart from space) than can be found elsewhere in Western Europe. Opinions in Great Britain and France are no better than a standoff now and in respect to future possibilities. (Owing to a confusion in procedure results are not available for Italy in the present connection).

Since interviewing in the present survey antedated recent U.S. space successes it may be presumed that present opinion is better than that indicated -- just how much better can only be said with further research. With the very large predominances of adverse sentiment indicated in the present survey, and the likelihood of some crystallization of opinion over a year and a half of space experiences, it would be unwise to assume that the U.S. has moved out of second place.

"Please indicate for each of the following, first, which country -the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. -- do you think is ahead at the present
time and secondly, regardless of who is now ahead, who do you
think is likely to be ahead 10 years from now.

"First, all things considered, which country do you think is ahead at the present time -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. ?"

And which is likely to be ahead 10 years from now? Next ...."

		AT PRES	SENT TIME		TEN YEARS FROM NOW				
•	Great	West		_	Great	West			
•	<u>Britain</u>	Germany	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>	Germany		Italy	
	<b>Feb</b> 。 ⁰60	Feb。 ¹60	Feb。 ⁰60	Feb。 º 60	Feb。 <sup>1</sup> 60	Feb。 ⁰60	Feb。 º60	Feb。 °60	
No. of cases	$(1\overline{221})$	(1222)	$(1\overline{228})$	$(1\overline{170})$	$(1\overline{221})$	$(1\overline{222})$	$(1\overline{228})$	$(1\overline{170})$	
<pre>In space developments:</pre>	•								
U.S. ahead	5%	7%	2%	11%	18%	17%	9%	21%	
U.S.S.R. ahead	84	77	85	75	51	35	41	<b>3</b> 9	
Neither ahead	2	3	3	3	6	11	10	5	
No opinion	9	13	10	11	25	37	40	35	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Net Favorable	-79	-70	<del>-</del> 83	-64	-33	-18	<b>-</b> 32	-18	
In scientific									
development:			,		•		•	•	
	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	
U.S. ahead	25%	45%	18%	40%	25%	33%	14%	27%	
U.S.S.R. ahead	58	27	58	33	40	21	35	25	
Neither ahead	4	9	9	4	7	10	10	4	
No opinion	13_	_19_	<u>15</u>	23	_28_	36_	41	44	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Net Favorable	<del>-</del> 33	18	-40	7	-15	12	-21	2	
In general scientific					-				
development apart									
from space science:		***	<i>'</i>			*	,		
	(613)	(599)	(608)		(613)	(599)	(808)		
U.S. ahead	38%	59%	29%		30%	39%	17%		
U.S.S.R. ahead	36	18	31	NA	29	13	21	NA	
Neither ahead	7	<b>5</b> .	12		8	9	10		
No opinion	19	18	28		33	39	52		
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%		
Net Favorable	2	41	-2		1	26	<b>-4</b>		
- ·						-			

The three areas listed above are in a logical order most convenient for presentation. On the interview questionnaire the inquiry about standing in scientific development preceded that about space developments so that respondents would not be reminded of the latter but would only take space considerations into account to the extent that they were moved to do so. The question about scientific standing apart from space science was asked on the alternate form of the split-half questionnaire to eliminate any possibility of an artificial consistency in the two judgments. Judgments about these areas were made in conjunction with a series of other areas, to be discussed, distributed between the two forms of the questionnaire.

### TREND IN GENERAL SCIENTIFIC STANDING ...

Since the question employed in the present study is similar to one posed in past surveys on U.S. versus Soviet scientific development, it is possible to examine what the trend in opinion has been on this particular measure. It will be seen below that the results of the latest survey show a marked worsening of opinion in Great Britain and France since an October 1958 measurement, and in fact bring the latest level to approximately the same low point registered immediately after the initial Sputnik launchings. Opinions continue more favorable among West Germans, who have been shown to have generally greater respect for American science; and, for reasons that are not clear, opinions appear to have recently improved by a substantial amount in Italy.

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in scientific development at the present time. Considerably ahead or only a little?"

	Gre	at Brita	in	West Germany			
No. of cases	Nov. 157 (800)	Oct. <u>*58</u> (587)	Feb. 160 <sup>2</sup> (608)	Nov. <u>'57</u> (813)	Oct. '58 (1195)	Feb. 2 (623)	
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia U.S. a little ahead	7% 13	17% 26	( <sub>25%</sub>	1 <b>4%</b> 22	15% 29	( <sub>45%</sub>	
Russia a little ahead of U.S. Russia considerably ahead	39 19	23 7	( <sub>58</sub>	27 5	19 4	( <sub>27</sub>	
Both equal (Vol.) No opinion	6 16 100%	12 <u>15</u> 100%	4 13 100%	15 <u>17</u> 100%	19 <u>14</u> 100%	9 19 100%	
Net U.S. ahead	-38	13	-33	4	21	18	

		France	,	Italy					
No. of cases	Nov. *57 (802)	Oct. <u>*58</u> (596)	Feb. 2 (620)	Nov. 157 (807)	Oct. <u>'58</u> (637)	Apr. <u>'59</u> (1076)	Nov. <u>'59</u> (691)	Dec. <u>'59</u> (650)	Feb, <u>'60</u> <sup>2</sup> (579)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia U.S. a little ahead	4% 7	5% 15	(18%	12% 11	15% 18	10% 16	11 <b>%</b> 9	11% 9	(40%
Russia a little ahead of U.S. Russia considerably ahead	29 20	21 13	58	24 13	16 14	15 13	27 18	26 16	( <sub>33</sub>
Both equal (Vol.) No opinion	16 <u>24</u> 100%	33 13 100%	9 <u>15</u> 100%	21 <u>19</u> 100%	21 <u>16</u> 100%	26 20 100%	17 <u>18</u> 100%	21 17 100%	4 23 100%
Net U.S. ahead	<b>-</b> 38	-14	-40	-14	3 -	-2 /	-25	-22	7

Readers are again reminded that these measurements antedated recent U.S. space successes.

The February 1960 wording is basically comparable, but the format has been somewhat revised as part of a comparative question.

HOW STRONG IS THE DESIRE TO SEE THE U.S. AHEAD IN SPACE? ...

To help evaluate the precise public opinion implications of any U.S. lag behind the Soviets in space standing, respondents were asked the two part question below with the results that follow. It may be observed, first, that a substantial proportion in all four countries would prefer to see the U.S. lead the U.S.S.R. in the space area, and only relatively few prefer the converse. But what is perhaps more interesting is the large body of sentiment in all four countries apparently in favor of neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. being ahead of the other in space developments.

Such a viewpoint provides considerable food for thought and certainly in further research the reasons lying behind it need to be explored. Whatever the motivations, the position for the most part does not appear to be lightly held since more often than not it was characterized as "very important" rather than "not so important" by its proponents.

"Going back to space developments for a moment, what would be best, in your opinion -- for the U.S. to be ahead in space developments, the U.S.S.R. to be ahead, or neither to be ahead? How important do you think this is -- very important or not so important?"

No. of cases	Great <u>Britain</u> Feb. <u>*60</u> (608)	West Germany Feb. '60 (623)	France Feb. '60 (620)	Italy Feb. '60 (579)
Prefer U.S. ahead - very important Prefer U.S. ahead - not so important	33%( <sub>43</sub> 10 (	27%( <sub>38</sub>	20%( <sub>25</sub> 5 (25	28 <b>%(</b> 36
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - very important Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - not so important	1 (3	* ( * ~ (	4 (6	10 (13
Prefer neither ahead - very important Prefer neither ahead - not so important	32 ( <sub>44</sub> 12 (	32 ( <sub>47</sub> 15 (	31 ( <sub>56</sub> 25 (	25 (31 6 (31
No opinion	10 100%	15 100%	13 100%	20 100%

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## IV. Current And Anticipated U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standings in Major Fields of Competition

To help put comparative U.S. and U.S.S.R. standings in the scientific and military areas in a larger perspective, questions were elaborated in the latest survey to include other of the more significant dimensions of U.S.-Soviet competition. In each case, as has been explained, judgments were sought both about present leadership and the anticipated situation 10 years hence, to obtain an insight into visions of the future.

## AREAS OF U.S. LEADERSHIP ...

The tabulated results are presented below in three convenient groupings. The group to be examined first embraces the areas of competition in which the U.S., almost without exception, is predominantly judged to hold a lead over the U.S.S.R., both now and in future anticipations.

It may be observed first that among the areas studied the U.S. lead is greatest on the average in respect to general living standards. Large predominances in all four countries judge the U.S. as currently ahead of the U.S.S.R. in this respect, and likely to remain ahead 10 years hence.

Next, clear U.S. leads in West European opinion are evident for today and 10 years hence in providing economic aid to other countries, in social welfare provisions, and in general non-technical education.

Lesser U.S. leads on the average are evidenced for medical science and the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. In both these respects future anticipations in France approach an uncertain and somewhat divided state of opinion.

"Please indicate for each of the following, first which country -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. -- do you think is ahead at the present time and secondly, regardless of who is now ahead, who do you think is likely to be ahead 10 years from now."

			SENT TIM	E		TEN YEARS FROM NOW			
No. of cases	Great Britain Feb. '60 (613)	West Germany Feb. *60 (599)	France Feb. '60 (608)	<u>Italy</u> Feb. <u>'60</u> (591)	Great Britain Feb. *60 (613)	West Germany Feb. *60 (599)	France Feb. '60 (608)	Italy Feb. <u>'60</u> (591)	
In general liv- ing standards:	•	, ,							
U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahea Neither ahead		88% 1 *	77% 2 5	77% 6 2	67% 6 4	66% 4 3	45% 7 8	54% 12 3	
No opinion	11 100%	11 100%	16 100%	15 100%	23 100%	27 100%	100%	31 100%	
Net Favorable	84	87	75	71	61	62	38	42	

Here and throughout, it will be noted that the extent of no opinion is considerably greater for estimates of what will be the case 10 years hence than for current judgments. This greater no opinion tends automatically to reduce the values for the net favorable index. This effect should not be looked upon as wholly an artifact, however, since people who aren't sure that the U.S. will be ahead are clearly expressing a less favorable position than those who do feel the U.S. will remain ahead.

			SENT TIME		TEN YEARS FROM NOW					
	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy	Great <u>Britain</u>	West Germany	France	Italy		
	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.		
	(60	<u>'60</u>	(60	(501)	(60	(60 (500)	(60)	( <del>60</del> )		
No. of cases	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)		
<pre>In providing economic   aid to other countries:</pre>				•			·* *			
U.S. ahead	68%	61%	57%	67%	48%	40%	29%	49%		
U.S.S.R. ahead	7	11	4	8	8	10	8	11		
Neither ahead	7	6	8	4	9	8	6 57	5		
No opinion	<u>18</u> 100%	22 100%	<u>31</u> 100%	21 100%	35 100%	42 100%	<u>57</u> 100%	35 100%		
Net Favorable	61	50	53	59	40	30	21	38		
Net laterable	<b>01</b>		••	,				•		
In social welfare pro-	(600)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)		
visions for its citizen		•	· ·			-	•	50%		
U.S. ahead	62%	63%	55%	65%	50%	50%	31%	20		
U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead	14 6	8 7	9 11	16	16 5	9 7	13 13	. 3		
No opinion	18	22	25	3 16	29	34	43	27		
No opinion	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Net Favorable	48	55	46	49	34	41	18	30		
Net 1 avoluble	40	<b>55</b>		.42	54		10	50		
<pre>In general non-technical   education:</pre>										
U.S. ahead	53%	80%	50%	36%	41%	60%	30%	27%		
U.S.S.R. ahead	13	2.	9	16	14	6	10	13		
Neither ahead	4	3 ·	14	5	6	6	13	5		
No opinion	_30_	15	27	43	39	28	47	55		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Net Favorable	40 .	78	41	20	27	54	20	14		
In medical science:										
U.S. ahead	62%	61%	40%	45%	48%	45%	24%	32%		
U.S.S.R. ahead	11	9	14	18	13	10	15	16		
Neither ahead	7 20	7	21	4	7	11	17	3		
No opinion	100%	23 100%	25 100%	33 100%	32 100%	34 100%	100%	49 100%		
Net Favorable	51	52	26	27	35	35	9	16		
		-		<del>-</del> ·			-			
In developing peaceful uses of atomic energy:	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)	´(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)		
U.S. ahead	44%	60%	29%	46%	35%	42%	18%	32%		
U.S.S.R. ahead	10	8	19	19	11	8	13	17		
Neither ahead	16	7	13	7	13	8	11	6		
No opinion	30	25	39	28	41	42	<u>58</u>	45		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Net Favorable	34	52	10	27	24	34	5	15		

A second group of areas of competition may now be studied, in which the U.S. is doing less well in that it does not clearly lead the U.S.S.R. in most of the countries currently and in the future. The least adverse area in this group is that of industrial production which shows the U.S. ahead in current judgments, but not appreciably ahead in Great Britain or France for 10 years hence. The pattern of returns for this area, particularly in Great Britain, suggests considerable absorption of Soviet claims of tremendous industrial advancements.

The next area in which the U.S. standing vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. shows some weakness is that of culture -- music, literature and the arts. Again in Great Britain U.S. prestige leaves much to be desired, with if anything the U.S.S.R. ahead. And in France, too, U.S. standing is weak with no clear predominance of favorable opinion, especially for the future. In striking contrast, U.S. culture stands far above that of the Soviets in the eyes of West Germans, who have been shown in other studies over the past decade to have a very low opinion of Soviet culture.

More so than for industrial production Soviet claims for agriculture appear to be striking a responsive chord in Western Europe. Currently in Great Britain the U.S. lead is at most slight, and future estimates tip the balance to the Soviet side except in West Germany.

As has already been indicated in the earlier discussion of comparative scientific prestige, U.S. standing in general science, even apart from space developments, is currently -- except in West Germany -- no greater than that of the U.S.S.R.

Finally, in the area of scientific and technical education the U.S. is predominantly seen as ahead at the present time only in West Germany. And even in that country the U.S. lead fades in the estimates of 10 years hence to a rather small margin.

"Please indicate for each of the following, first which country -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. -- do you think is ahead at the present time and secondly, regardless of who is now ahead, who do you think is likely to be ahead 10 years from now."

Great	AT PRES	ENT TIME		TE Great	TEN YEARS FROM NOW Great West				
Britain Feb. 60 No. of cases (613)	Germany Feb. '60 (599)	France Feb. *60 (608)	Italy Feb. 60 (591)	Britain Feb. 60 (613)	Germany Feb. '60 (599)	France Feb. '60 (608)	Italy Feb. '60 (591)		
In industrial production:									
U.S. ahead 48%	70%	49%	57%	30%	43%	20%	33%		
U.S.S.R. ahead 22	7	11	. 12	24 7	13	17	17		
Neither ahead 4	2	9	3	•	8	10	4		
No opinion <u>26</u> 100%	21 100%	<u>31</u> 100%	28 100%	39 100%	<u>36</u> 100%	53 100%	46 100%		
Net Favorable 26	63	38	45	6	30	3	16		

	Great Britain	AT PRESE West Germany	NT TIME	Italy	<u>TE</u> Great Britain	N YEARS F West Germany	ROM NOW	Italy
	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.
No. of cases	<u>°60</u> (608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	( <del>623)</del>	(620)	<u>'60</u> (579)
In the cultural field music, literature, the arts:					. •			-
U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	31% 38 7 24 100%	74% 3 4 <u>19</u> 100%	26% 21 18 35 100%	43% 12 7 38 100%	25% 33 5 <u>37</u> 100%	57% 4 7 32 100%	19% 16 17 48 100%	35% 11 8 46 100%
Net Favorable	-7	71	5	31	-8	53	3	24
In agricultural production:	(600)	(599)	(608)	(591)	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)
U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	(608) 36% 31 6 27 100%	59% 13 2 <u>26</u> 100%	36% 19 10 35 100%	38% 29 2 31 100%	25% 30 6 39 100%	37% 16 8 39 100%	15% 21 10 54 100%	23% 29 3 45 100%
Net Favorable	5	46	17	9	<b>-</b> 5	21	<b>-</b> 6	-6
In general scientific development apart from space science:	s.							
U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	38% 36 7 <u>19</u> 100%	59% 18 5 <u>18</u> 100%	29% 31 12 28 100%	NA	30% 29 8 <u>33</u> 100%	39% 13 9 39 100%	17% 21 10 <u>52</u> 100%	<b>NA</b>
Net Favorable	2	41	-2		1	26	-4	
<pre>In scientific and   technical education:</pre>	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	34% 40 5 21 100%	47% 27 7 <u>19</u> 100%	26% 32 11 31 100%	31% 28 4 <u>37</u> 100%	28% 34 6 <u>32</u> 100%	33% 22 12 33 100%	16% 25 13 46 100%	24% 22 4 50 100%
Net Favorable	-6	20	-6	3	-6	11	-9	2

## AREAS OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP...

A third group of areas are those in which the U.S.S.R. is ahead, on the average, both in current judgments and in future projections. Three out of the four elements in this category lie in the domain of scientific and military comparisons which have already been discussed. The fourth relates to athletic achievements. Apparently the Soviet sports achievements in recent Olympics and elsewhere have made a deep impression on West European thinking, since in all four countries they are predominantly seen as ahead of the U.S. now and, least reliably in Italy, in the future.

AT PRESENT TIME

"Please indicate for each of the following, first which country -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., -- do you think is ahead at the present time and secondly, regardless of who is now ahead, who do you think is likely to be ahead 10 years from now."

TEN YEARS FROM NOW

		AI PRESENT TIME			TEN TEARS FROM NOW			
	Great	West			Great	West		
	<u>Britain</u>	Germany	France	Italy	Britain	Germany	France	Italy
	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.	Feb.
	<u>°60</u>	<u>°60</u>	<u>°60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>°60</u>	<u>'60</u>
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
	` ,	• • • •	` '		` '		,	
<u>In scientific</u>								
development:								
de veropmene.								
U.S. ahead	25%	45%	18%	40%	25%	33%	14%	27%
U.S.S.R. ahead	- 58	27	58	33	40	21	35	25
Neither ahead	4	9	9	- 4	7	10	10	4
No opinion	13_	19	15	23	28	36	41	44
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favor-								
able	-33	18	-40	7	16	12	01	2
apie	-33	10	-40	,	-15	12	-21	2
In total military								
strength:	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)
Strength.	(OIO)	(3))/	(000)	(391)	(013)	(377)	(000)	(391)
U.S. ahead	15%	0.00/	16%	38%	1.40/	1.00/	00/	010/
		22%			14%	18%	8%	21%
U.S.S.R. ahead	59	47	37	32	43	29	24	27
Neither ahead	4	8 .	16	5	7	11	10	6
No opinion	22	23	31	. 25	36	42	58	46
opinion								
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favor-								
able	-44	-25	-21	6	-29	-11	-16	-6
T 41-1 - 4 1 -				/==a\	1100			/
in athletic	(608)	(623)	(620)	15701	(608)	(623)	(620)	(570)
<u>In athletic</u>	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
achievements:	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
achievements:		•						
u.S. ahead	19%	15%	17%	23%	14%	11%	11%	18%
achievements:		•						18%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead	19% 55	15% 57	17% 32	23% 36	14% 45	11% 42	11% 25	18% 25
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead	19% 55 8	15% 57 7	17% 32 15	23% 36 3	14% 45 7	11% 42 11	11% <b>25</b> 10	18% 25 2
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead	19% 55 8 18	15% 57 7 21	17% 32 15 36	23% 36 3 38	14% 45 7 34	11% 42 11 36	11% 25 10 54	18% 25 2 55
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead	19% 55 8	15% 57 7	17% 32 15	23% 36 3	14% 45 7	11% 42 11	11% <b>25</b> 10	18% 25 2
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	19% 55 8 18	15% 57 7 21	17% 32 15 36	23% 36 3 38	14% 45 7 34	11% 42 11 36	11% 25 10 54	18% 25 2 55
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion Net Favor-	19% 55 8 <u>18</u> 100%	15% 57 7 21 100%	17% 32 15 36 100%	23% 36 3 3 100%	14% 45 7 <u>34</u> 100%	11% 42 11 <u>36</u> 100%	11% 25 10 54 100%	18% 25 2 55 100%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	19% 55 8 18	15% 57 7 21	17% 32 15 36	23% 36 3 38	14% 45 7 34	11% 42 11 36	11% 25 10 54	18% 25 2 55
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion Net Favor-	19% 55 8 <u>18</u> 100%	15% 57 7 21 100%	17% 32 15 36 100%	23% 36 3 3 100%	14% 45 7 <u>34</u> 100%	11% 42 11 <u>36</u> 100%	11% 25 10 54 100%	18% 25 2 55 100%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion Net Favor- able	19% 55 8 <u>18</u> 100%	15% 57 7 21 100%	17% 32 15 36 100%	23% 36 3 3 100%	14% 45 7 <u>34</u> 100%	11% 42 11 <u>36</u> 100%	11% 25 10 54 100%	18% 25 2 55 100%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion Net Favor- able In space develop-	19% 55 8 <u>18</u> 100%	15% 57 7 21 100%	17% 32 15 36 100%	23% 36 3 38 100%	14% 45 7 <u>34</u> 100%	11% 42 11 36 100%	11% 25 10 54 100%	18% 25 2 55 100%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion Net Favor- able	19% 55 8 <u>18</u> 100%	15% 57 7 21 100%	17% 32 15 36 100%	23% 36 3 38 100%	14% 45 7 <u>34</u> 100%	11% 42 11 <u>36</u> 100%	11% 25 10 54 100%	18% 25 2 55 100%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments:	19% 55 8 18 100% -36	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222)	17% 32 15 36 100% -15	23% 36 3 38 100% -13	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221)	11% 42 11 36 100% -31	11% 25 10 54 100% -14	18% 25 2 55 100% -7
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments: U.S. ahead	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5%	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7%	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2%	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11%	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18%	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17%	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9%	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2% 85	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17% 35	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments: U.S. ahead	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7%	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2%	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11%	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18%	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17%	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39
achievements:  U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favorable  In space developments:  U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77 3	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2% 85 3	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75 3	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51 6	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17% 35 11	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41 10	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39 5
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2 9	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77 3 13	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2% 85 3 10	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75 3 11	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51 6 25	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17% 35 11 37	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41 10 40	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39 5 35
achievements:  U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favorable  In space developments:  U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77 3	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2% 85 3	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75 3	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51 6	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17% 35 11	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41 10	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39 5
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2 9	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77 3 13	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2% 85 3 10	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75 3 11	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51 6 25	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17% 35 11 37	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41 10 40	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39 5 35
achievements:  U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments:  U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor-	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2 9 100%	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77 3 13 100%	17% 32 15 36 100% -15  (1228) 2% 85 3 10 100%	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75 3 11 100%	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51 6 25 100%	11% 42 11 36 100% -31  (1222) 17% 35 11 37 100%	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41 10 40 100%	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39 5 35 100%
achievements: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion  Net Favor- able  In space develop- ments: U.S. ahead U.S.S.R. ahead Neither ahead No opinion	19% 55 8 18 100% -36 (1221) 5% 84 2 9	15% 57 7 21 100% -42 (1222) 7% 77 3 13	17% 32 15 36 100% -15 (1228) 2% 85 3 10	23% 36 3 38 100% -13 (1170) 11% 75 3 11	14% 45 7 34 100% -31 (1221) 18% 51 6 25	11% 42 11 36 100% -31 (1222) 17% 35 11 37	11% 25 10 54 100% -14 (1228) 9% 41 10 40	18% 25 2 55 100% -7 (1170) 21% 39 5 35

## V. U.S. Versus Soviet Faith and Dedication

The study of U.S. versus Soviet standings in various areas of competition was supplemented by two inquiries into more personal qualities of the American and Soviet peoples. It proved to be very difficult to put such abstract concepts as devotion to ideals and dedication to national purposes into terms that would be understood by all levels of a national sample, and in the effort perhaps the measures do not come out as wholly unambiguous in meaning. Taken at face value the indications appear to be that West Europeans predominantly view the Soviet people as having greater faith in their basic principles, and by very large margins, as being willing to work harder to have their country lead in national achievement.

It is possible, of course, that the first indication is merely a recognition of fanaticism, and the second merely a recognition that a largely "have not" nation will obviously put forth more effort than one that has already achieved as much as the U.S. But even with their limitations the findings at least raise the possibility that in certain "national morale" respects the U.S. does not compete wholly favorably with the Soviet Union in the eyes of West Europeans.

"Now a brief comparison on more personal qualities between the Soviet people and those of the U.S.: Who do you think has greater faith in their basic principles — the Soviet people or the people of the U.S.?

"And who do you believe is willing to work harder to have their country lead the other in national achievement?"

Greater Faith:	Great <u>Britain</u> Feb.	West Germany Feb.	France Feb.	Italy Feb.
No. of cases	<u>°60</u> (613)	<u>°60</u> (599)	<u>*60</u> (608)	<u>'60</u> (591)
Soviet people People of U.S. Both same No opinion	39% 28 15 <u>18</u> 100%	51% 18 12 19	44% 14 19 <u>23</u> 100%	35% 28 18 19 100%
Net Favorable	-11	<b>-3</b> 3	-30	<b>-</b> 7
Willing to work harder:				
Soviet people People of U.S. Both same No opinion	62% 14 11 13 100%	65% 10 8 <u>17</u> 100%	67% 5 11 17 100%	52% 11 17 20 100%
Net Favorable	-48	-55	-62	-41

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## VI. Will Soviet Communism Bury U.S. Capitalism?

Finally, a question was posed to test the West European impact of Premier Khrushchev's oft-repeated thesis that the Soviet Union will "bury the U.S." economically. The results make it evident that only the order of one in ten or less believe that the Soviet economic system will supersede that of the U.S. in the long run. Conversely, few believe that the U.S. economic system will replace that of the Soviets. The prevailing views are either that both systems will continue to be different and exist indefinitely side by side, or that they will grow increasingly alike until there is no major difference between them. In this latter case, slightly more in the four countries taken together, see the resultant economy as closer to the U.S. type than as closer to the Soviet model.

"Thinking now about the U.S. economic system and the Soviet economic system, which of these do you believe is most likely to occur in the long run?" (CARD)

If "D" response: "In your opinion, is the resultant
system likely to be more like the present U.S. economic
system, or more like the present Soviet economic system?"

	No. of cases	Great Britain Feb. '60 (608)	West Germany Feb. 160 (623)	France Feb. *60 (620)	Italy Feb. '60 (579)
Α.	The U.S. and the Soviet economic systems will continue to be different and will exist indefinite ly side by side.		39%	24%	24%
В。	The U.S. economic system will replace the Soviet economic system in the long run.		21	4	11
C.	The Soviet economic system will replace the U.S. economic system in the long run.	n 6	6	4	10
D.	The two economic systems will become increasingly alike until there is no major differences between them.  1. And the resultant system likely to be more like the U.S. system  2. More like the Soviet system  3. No opinion	8) 3) 14 3)	10) 2) 20 8)	11) 8) 33 14)	11) 7) 20 2)
No	opinion	28 100%	14 100%	35 100%	35 100%

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